The opcodes used in the pubkey scripts of standard transactions are:
Various data pushing opcodes from 0x00 to 0x4e (1--78). These aren't typically shown in examples, but they must be used to push signatures and public keys onto the stack. See the link below this list for a description.
OP_16(0x52--0x60), which push the values 1 through 16 to the stack.
OP_VERIFY(0x69) consumes the topmost item on the stack. If that item is zero (false) it terminates the script in failure.
OP_RETURN(0x6a) terminates the script in failure when executed.
OP_DUP(0x76) pushes a copy of the topmost stack item on to the stack.
OP_EQUAL(0x87) consumes the top two items on the stack, compares them, and pushes true onto the stack if they are the same, false if not.
OP_HASH160(0xa9) consumes the topmost item on the stack, computes the RIPEMD160(SHA256()) hash of that item, and pushes that hash onto the stack.
OP_CHECKSIG(0xac) consumes a signature and a full public key, and pushes true onto the stack if the transaction data specified by the SIGHASH flag was converted into the signature using the same ECDSA private key that generated the public key. Otherwise, it pushes false onto the stack.
OP_CHECKMULTISIG(0xae) consumes the value (n) at the top of the stack, consumes that many of the next stack levels (public keys), consumes the value (m) now at the top of the stack, and consumes that many of the next values (signatures) plus one extra value.
The "one extra value" it consumes is the result of an off-by-one error in the Bitcoin Core implementation. This value is not used, so signature scripts prefix the list of secp256k1 signatures with a single OP_0 (0x00).
OP_CHECKMULTISIGcompares the first signature against each public key until it finds an ECDSA match. Starting with the subsequent public key, it compares the second signature against each remaining public key until it finds an ECDSA match. The process is repeated until all signatures have been checked or not enough public keys remain to produce a successful result.
Because public keys are not checked again if they fail any signature comparison, signatures must be placed in the signature script using the same order as their corresponding public keys were placed in the pubkey script or redeem script. See the
OP_CHECKMULTISIGwarning below for more details.
Several opcodes were disabled in the Bitcoin scripting system due to the discovery of a series of bugs in the early days of Bitcoin. Dash Improvement Proposal 20 reintroduced a number of these opcodes based on work done by Bitcoin Cash developers. Many of the disabled opcodes have been enabled and several of them re-designed to replace the original ones.
The following opcodes were added/reactivated in Dash Core 0.17.0 as described in DIP 20.
OP_CAT(0x7e) concatenates two byte arrays.
OP_SPLIT(0x7f) Split byte array
n. This opcode was disabled and named
OP_SUBSTRprior to Dash Core 0.17.0.
OP_NUM2BIN(0x80) Convert numeric
ainto byte array of length
b. This opcode was disabled and named
OP_LEFTprior to Dash Core 0.17.0.
OP_BIN2NUM(0x81) Convert byte array
xinto numeric. This opcode was disabled and named
OP_RIGHTprior to Dash Core 0.17.0.
OP_AND(0x84) Boolean AND between each bit in the operands.
OP_OR(0x85) Boolean OR between each bit in the operands.
OP_XOR(0x86) Boolean EXCLUSIVE OR between each bit in the operands.
OP_DIV(0x96) Return the integer quotient of
b. If the result would be a non-integer it is rounded towards zero.
bare interpreted as numeric values.
OP_MOD(0x97) Returns the remainder after dividing
b. The output will be represented using the least number of bytes required.
bare interpreted as numeric values.
OP_CHECKDATASIG(0xba) Checks whether a signature is valid with respect to a message and a public key. It allows Script to validate arbitrary messages from outside the blockchain.
OP_CHECKDATASIGVERIFYis equivalent to
OP_VERIFY. It leaves nothing on the stack and will cause the script to fail immediately if the signature check does not pass.
Signature script modification warning: Signature scripts are not signed, so anyone can modify them. This means signature scripts should only contain data and data-pushing opcode which can't be modified without causing the pubkey script to fail. Placing non-data-pushing opcodes in the signature script currently makes a transaction non-standard, and future consensus rules may forbid such transactions altogether. (Non-data-pushing opcodes are already forbidden in signature scripts when spending a P2SH pubkey script.)
OP_CHECKMULTISIG warning: The multisig verification process described above requires that signatures in the signature script be provided in the same order as their corresponding public keys in the pubkey script or redeem script. For example, the following combined signature and pubkey script will produce the stack and comparisons shown:
OP_0 <A sig> <B sig> OP_2 <A pubkey> <B pubkey> <C pubkey> OP_3 Sig Stack Pubkey Stack (Actually a single stack) --------- ------------ B sig C pubkey A sig B pubkey OP_0 A pubkey 1. B sig compared to C pubkey (no match) 2. B sig compared to B pubkey (match #1) 3. A sig compared to A pubkey (match #2) Success: two matches found
But reversing the order of the signatures with everything else the same will fail, as shown below:
OP_0 <B sig> <A sig> OP_2 <A pubkey> <B pubkey> <C pubkey> OP_3 Sig Stack Pubkey Stack (Actually a single stack) --------- ------------ A sig C pubkey B sig B pubkey OP_0 A pubkey 1. A sig compared to C pubkey (no match) 2. A sig compared to B pubkey (no match) Failure, aborted: two signature matches required but none found so far, and there's only one pubkey remaining
Updated over 1 year ago